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Rule 1.6). The attorney-client privi-
lege, which "applies in judicial and 
other proceedings in which a lawyer 
may be called as a witness or otherwise 
required to produce evidence concern-
ing aclientL]" was distinguished from 
client-lawyer confidentiality, which 
"applies in situations other than those 
where evidence is sought from the 
lawyer through compulsion of law." 
Id at 5, 602 A.2d at 1222. The court 
concluded that because Rule 1.6 ap-
plied in all situations, except where the 
protected information was requested 
under compulsion of law, the rule of 
confidentiality was broader in scope. 
Applying the attorney-client privi-
lege to the instant case, the court found 
that the information sought was be-
yond the scope of the privilege. The 
client's explicit request that informa-
tion be kept confidential did not create 
a privilege under the law. While the 
court acknowledged that the attorney-
client privilege is necessary to our le-
gal system in order to assure that cli-
ents do not hesitate to seek legal advice 
or to confide in their lawyers, the court 
qualified this observation by noting 
that "[t]he privilege is not absolute; it 
does not restrict disclosure of every 
aspect of what occurs between the at-
torney and the client." Id. at 11, 602 
A.2d at 1225. 
The court noted that a clear major-
ity of jurisdictions have held that re-
quiring disclosure of attorney's fees 
did not violate the attorney-client privi-
lege. Attorney's fees were an expected 
part of the relationship and to some 
extent the client was involved with the 
attorney in an arms-length transaction 
that was collateral to the privileged 
relationship. Id. at 7, 602 A.2d at 
1223. 
The court described three general 
exceptions to the rule requiring disclo-
sure of attorney's fees. The "legal 
advice" exception would apply where 
the "disclosure of the information 
would implicate the client in the very 
matter for which legal advice was 
sought in the first case." Id. at 7,602 
A.2dat 1223 (quotingIn re GrandJury 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 695 F.2d 
363 (9th Cir. 1982». Another excep-
tion called the "last link" had been 
applied where only the client's identity 
was sought. The "communication ex-
ception" had been applied when "dis-
closure of the client's identity or the 
existence of a fee arrangement would 
reveal information that is tantamount 
to a confidential professional commu-
nication." Id at 9, 602 A.2d at 1224. 
The court, however, concluded that 
these exceptions were "ill-defined and 
overlapping" and in any case, distin-
guishable from the case. Id. at 7, 602 
A.2d at 1223. 
Judge Bell, in the lone dissent, 
agreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of Rule 1.6, as well as with the 
conclusion that the instant case did not 
fall under the recognized exceptions 
where the attorney-client privilege 
would be implicated. He dissented, 
nonetheless, because he found the ra-
tionale presented for the majority's 
holding that fee information was not 
'confidential unpersuasive. Id. at 16, 
602 A.2d at 1227. Payment of 
attorney's fees, he contended, was at 
the core rather than collateral to the 
attorney-client relationship and should, 
therefore, be privileged. Id. at 19,602 
A.2d at 1229. 
By allowing the subpoena of attor-
ney fee records, the court has given 
prosecutor another avenue for collect-
ing evidence in the zealous hunt for 
drug traffickers. Presumably evidence 
offees paid to an attorney would not be 
the only available evidence to estab-
lish the net worth of a suspect. More 
importantly, knowing that his 
attorney's fee records are likely to be 
subpoenaed in any future action against 
him, an individual accused of a crime 
involving large sums of money will 
think twice before he establishes this 
record. Allowing ready access to fee 
records may at some point conflict 
with Maryland's clear public policy of 
encouraging accused citizens to seek 
legal assistance without fear oflack of 
confidentiality. 
- Dianne Moorehead Hughes 
UnitedStatesDep'tofEnergyv. Ohio: 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PRO-
TECTED DEP'T FROM CIVIL 
PENAL TIES FOR PAST VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT AND RESOURCE CONSER-
VATION RECOVERY ACT. 
In United States Dep 't of Energy v. 
Ohio, 112 S. Ct 1627 (1992), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the 
Department of Energy ("DOE'') is ex-
empt from state and federal civil pen-
alties for past violations ofthe Clean 
Water Act ("CW A") and the Resource 
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA''). 
The Court held that because Congress 
did not expressly waive the federal 
government's sovereign immunity con-
cerning past violations of the CW A 
and the RCRA, the federal government 
may only be liable for coercive fines 
which prospectively modify behavior. 
In 1986, the State of Ohio sued the 
DOE for improperly disposing ofhaz-
ardous wastes from its uranium pro-
cessing plant in violation ofthe CW A 
and the RCRA. Relying on the federal 
facilities and citizen suit sections of the 
CWA and the RCRA, Ohio pursued 
both state and federal civil penalties 
for the DOE's past violations of these 
laws. The federal facilities sections 
govern the extent to which federal op-
erations are subject to the CW A and 
RCRA statutes. The citizen suit sec-
tions allow private individuals to en-
force the CW A and RCRA. Ohio 
brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Ohio, which held that 
the CW A and the RCRA federal facili-
ties and citizen suit sections waived 
federal sovereign immunity for civil 
penalties. Holding that Congress 
waived immunity in all but the RCRA 
federal facilities section, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affmned in part and reversed in 
part. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether 
Congress waived immunity for puni-
tive fines in the CW A and the RCRA. 
The Court began its analysis by 
stating the common rule "that any 
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waiver of the national government's 
sovereign immunity must beunequivo-
cal .... " Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633. The 
Court next analyzed the CW A and the 
RCRA similar citizen suit sections. 
The Court noted that the CW A citizen 
suit section allows "any person" to be 
held liable for past violations. [d. 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988)). 
However, the Court determined that 
''neither statute defines person to in-
clude the United States." [d. at 1634. 
As a result, the Court found that the 
civil penalties provision of the citizen 
suit section, did not apply to the United 
States. The Court explained its reason-
ing by pointing out that in other parts 
of the statute, Congress explicitly de-
fined ''person'' to include the United 
States. Because Congress failed to do 
so in the civil penalties section, the 
Court held that Congress did not in-
tend to waive sovereign immunity. 
The Court next analyzed the CW A's 
federal facilities section to determine if 
civil penalties were allowed under that 
section. Ohio argued that the civil pen-
alties section waived the government's 
sovereign immunity. Ohio further ar-
gued that the section used the word 
"sanction" to mean civil penalty, which 
can include a punitive fme. The Court 
agreed with Ohio's assertion that the 
principle of waiver applied to the gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, the Court ex-
plained that the word "sanction" does 
not necessarily mean ''punitive fine," 
but also connotes coerciveness. Ohio, 
112 S. Ct. at 1637. 
Additionally, the Court held that 
Congress intended "sanction" to have 
a coercive implication. The Court 
found that the word "sanction" was 
used in the statute in conjunction with 
''process and sanctions." [d. Because 
"sanction" was used in relation with 
the word ''process,'' which generally 
refers to looking forward, the sanc-
tions were found to be related to future 
actions. 
The Court refused to adopt Ohio's 
argument that ''penalties prescribed by 
state statutes" which had met Environ-
mental Protection Agency approval 
under the CW A were penalties "aris-
ing under federal laws." Ohio, 112 S. 
Ct. at 1638 .. Ohio buttressed its argu-
ment by noting that its state laws were 
enacted pursuant to federal law and 
thatthepwposeofOhio's laws were to 
enforce the CW A. [d. The Court 
rejected this argument, holding that 
"arising under federal law" does not 
include situations where state law is 
relied upon, even if such state law is 
ultimately bound by federal restric-
tions. [d. The Court recalled the re-
quirement that any waiver of govern-
mental immunity must be unequivo-
cal, and noted that such a waiver was 
not in the CW A. [d. at 1639. 
Finally, the Court analyzed the fed-
eral facilities section of the RCRA. 
The Court interpreted that section's 
language excluding the government 
from punitive measures, such as civil 
penalties. [d. at 1639-40. The Court 
did not find any language in the section 
indicating that past violations should 
be penalized, and concluded that Con-
gress had no intention of subjecting the 
United States to punitive fines forpast 
violations of the RCRA. [d. at 1640. 
Justice White, in a partial dissent 
and partial concurrence, joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens, noted 
that the majority did not follow tradi-
tional rules of statutory construction 
and that the majority did not read the 
"statute . . . as a whole." Ohio, 112 
S. Ct. at 1141. The dissent concluded 
that the CWA's federal facilities sec-
tion provides that ''the United States 
shall be liable" for civil penalties aris-
ing under state law. [d. (quoting 33 
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)). The dissent 
also believed that CW A's citizen suit 
section provided "authority to sue any 
person (including ... the United States 
.... )" Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1142. 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988)). 
The dissent further noted that the 
CW A specifically provided for "an 
extraordinary level of [federal] in-
volvement" in state enforcement, blur-
ring the distinction between federal 
and state law. [d at 1643. As such, the 
state law should be considered as "aris-
ing under" federal law, and the United 
States sovereign immunity should be 
considered waived. [d Finally, the 
minority concurred with the majority 
that the RCRA federal facilities provi-
sion did not provide for waiver of 
sovereign immunity. [d. at 1144. Nev-
ertheless, the minority did believe that 
the RCRA citizen suit section pro-
vided for waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. [d. 
In United States Dep't of Energy v. 
Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the 
federal government cannot be penal-
ized for past CW A and RCRA viola-
tions. By so ruling, the Court may 
have encouraged government agencies 
to ignore violations of the CW A and 
the RCRA statutes. The agencies now 
have less incentive to detect and cease 
governmental violations, since such 
agencies will not be liable for punitive 
fines for past violations. The message 
to the federal government is clear: 
pollute until you get caught, and only 
then take corrective measures. 
- Bruce D. Hechmer 
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